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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

TRADE REsTRAIN~VIoLATION oF RoBINSON-PATMAN ACT AS A
DEFENSE TO SuIT FOR PURCHASE PRICE OF Gooos-Plaintiff brought suit
against defendant on renewal notes aggregating about $I I4,ooo, the notes
representing an accumulated debt on defendant's purchases of cans over a sixyear period. Defendant alleged discriminatory quantity discounts in violation
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of the Robinson-Patman Act.1 This violation was urged as. a defense on two
theories: (I) that it denied any recovery of the purchase price, or ( 2) that it
denied, at the least, the recovery of the amount of discrimination which, it was
alleged, substantially represented the amount of the notes. The Supreme Court
of Florida rejected the defense. Held, affirmed. Four justices dissented. Bruce's
Juices, Inc. 'lJ. American Can Company, (U.S. 1947) 67 S. Ct. 1015.
The illegality of plaintiff's conduct was asserted as a defense in actions to
enforce contracts at common law where a distinction was made between illegalities "inherent in the contract" and those merely "collateral" to it. 2 This distinction was carried over to cases in which violation of the anti-trust laws was
asserted as a defense. 8 The possibility of asserting the defense in this area was
further limited by the "exclusive remedies" doctrine, which denied other than
the statutory remedies in order to -prevent frustration of public enforcement
and windfalls to the defending party. 41 For a period of twenty years prior to
1942 the defense fared poorly in t}le federal courts. Since that time it has been
permitted to deny recovery on royalty contracts where the royalty provisions
'were "inseparable" from price-fixing provisions made illegal by the invalidity
of a patent,5 and to deny recovery for patent, trademark, and copyright infringement. 6 In holding that a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act is not
a complete defense to an action for the purchase price, the Court is substantially
in agreement; but, as to denying a pro tanto defense in the amount of the
discrimination, the opinions differ as to plaintiff's ability to show the fair value
of the cans on a quantum meruit basis, since the notes in question could not
be tied to any particular sales. The majority relies on the "exclusive remedies"
the absence of a continuity of interest. However, it did not overrule the Watts case
where the transferor receives both stock and bonds, the stock giving the necessary
continuity of interest. It would seem that obligations will be deemed securities only
if they are considered not to be the equivalent of cash. In the companion tq the
principal case, Adams v. Commissioner, twenty-year debentures were issued. Although
the court said the case was governed by its treatment of the Bazley case, it is submitted
that the court meant only in that here was no legitimate corporate purpose in the
recapitalization and not in the respect that the twenty-year debentures were not securities. In view of its decision in the Watts case, if the court meant to say twenty-year
debentures were not securities it would probably have expressly said so.
1

49 Stat. L. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. (1940) § 13.
McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U. S. 639, 19 S. Ct. 839 (1899); 5 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS, § 1661 (1937).
8
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.' S. 540, 22 S. Ct. 431 (1902);
Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Bay, 200 U. S. 179, 26 S.. Ct. 208 (1906); Continental
Wall Paper Co. v. Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227, 29 S. Ct. 280 (1909).
4
Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Products Co., 236 U.S. 165, 35 S. Ct. 398 (1915);
also see note in 38 CoL. L. REv. 192 (1938).
5
Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U. S. 173, 63 S. Ct. 172 (1942);
Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., (U.S. 11947) 67 S. Ct. 416; McGregor
v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., (U.S. 1947) 67 S. Ct. 421.
6
Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U. S. 488, 62 S. Ct. 402 (1942);
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U. S. 661, 64 S. Ct. 268 (1944);
Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Co., 320 U.S. 680, 64 S. Ct. 278 (1944);
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386, 65 S. Ct. 373 (1945).
2
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doctrine,7 but seems to indicate that that theory will not be applied mechanically:
Even though Congress did not specifically provide for the defense, 8 it might be
allowed if the "policy of the statute" would be effectuated thereby. The opinions
again differ as to how closely the illegality must be associated with the contract
sued on, the dissenting justices· showing a greater willingness to go ou_tside the
immediate transaction.9 They also state that the Court should not be unwilling
to consider such a complex problem as the economic effect of quantity discounts
on competition, even in the absence of prior action by the Federal Trade Commission, which the majori_ty intimates is desirable. While the - Court is still
concerned with the distinctions laid down in previous cases, this case indicates
that the "exclusive remedies" doctrine will not be employed dogmatically and
that repercussions of the defense on business relations will be considered.10
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7 The Robinson-Patman Act provides a number of diverse remedies: private suit
for injunction in a federal court, 38 Stat. L. 730 at 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1940)
§ 26; private suit for treble damages in a federal court, 38 Stat. L. 730 at 731 (1914),
15 U. S. C. (1940) § 15; public enforcement by Federal Trade Commission action
with power to issue cease-and-desist orders, 38 Stat. L. 730 at 734-5 (1914), 15
U.S.C (1940) § 21; or suits by a federal district attorney in a federal court for an
injunction restraining discrimination, 38 Stat. L. 73o'at 736-7 (1914), 15 U.S.C.
(1940) § 25.
8 The Trademark Act of 1946, 60 Stat. L. 427, 15 U.S. C. A. (1946) § 10511127, seems to provide for such a defense in § I I I 5 (§ 3 3) : " . . . (b) If the
right to use the registered -mark has become incontestible under section 1065 of this
title, the certificate shall be conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to
use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services
specified in the certificate subject to any conditions or limitations stated therein except
when one of the following defenses or defects is established: •.. (7) That the mark
has been or is being used to violate the anti-trust laws of the United States."
9 See. the patent cases cited supra, note 5.
10 It has been said that if the decision in Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Commissioii, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 378, cert. den., 326 U. S. 734, 66 S.
Ct. 44 (1945), rehearing den., 326 U.S. 809, 66 S. Ct. 165 (1945), modification
of decree den., (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 155 F. (2d) 1016, is settled law to the effect

